EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Emerging companies usually obtain outside equity financing from specialized investors, through formal and informal venture capital (VC) networks. These investors have developed skills, methods and tools to select, fund and monitor the most promising ventures. For these ventures, the growth path leads to the initial public offering (IPO) and exchange listing, which is the ultimate mark of success for venture capitalists (VCs). The company must then fulfill the minimal listing requirements, including having a track record of positive earnings and sufficient capitalization and float. In Europe, the emergence of technological companies and the willingness to foster a vibrant VC industry have prompted several countries to implement junior (or new) stock markets, which have had varying, but generally negative, outcomes. These junior markets apply more lenient listing rules. VCs view these markets as exit vehicles.
In Canada, a public venture capital market, the TSX Venture Exchange (TSXV), acts as a direct competitor to both formal and informal VC markets.
1 Newly created companies with no history or sales are allowed to list on the TSXV because of its very minimal listing requirements. The ultimate goal of the TSXV is to graduate its best performers to the main exchange, the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX), which according to international standards, is itself a junior market, and is partly fed by public venture capital. The literature generally considers that neither stock exchanges nor individual investors have the tools, skills and knowledge needed to successfully finance emerging companies. Indeed, even though they select companies at a more advanced developmental stage than does the TSXV, several junior markets devoted to growing companies have been deemed failures. Accordingly, both the literature and the past experiences of new markets indicate that the Canadian strategy is highly risky, and that the returns of such a market should be lower than those of a private VC market. Moreover, because of the lack of the asserted value-added activities of VCs and their role in backing IPOs, both the development and the exit rate of new ventures listed on the public venture exchange should be much lower than in the private market.
By analyzing new listings on the TSXV over a 21-year period, we evidence that the lax initial finance only a few of very many proposals received. Secondly, they focus on the few sectors in which a high rate of return can be expected. Thirdly, structuring a VC market is not an easy task, and, in most countries except in the U.S., and partially in the U.K., VC is generally perceived as insufficient or badly structured. To fill the assumed equity gap for emerging businesses, countries have implemented a large set of public programs. They have also attempted to fill this gap with specialized stock markets or specific segments of the main markets.
Junior (or new) markets have been established to ease the development of emerging businesses in
Europe (Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2005) , Japan (Mizuno, 2006) , the U.K. (Jenkinson and Ramadorai, 2007) , and several Asia-Pacific countries. Several papers have analyzed the global performance of these exchanges, mainly following the collapse of the first and second waves of the new markets in Europe (Rasch, 1994; Goergen et al., 2003) , but also after the fall of the Amex emerging companies marketplace (Aggarwal and Angel, 1999) and of the predecessor of the AIM -the Unlisted Securities Market (Buckland and Davis, 1989) . In spite of these failures, the development of small and medium sized enterprise (SME) markets devoted to high growth companies is still promoted by VC associations (EVCA, 2004) , mainly because such markets are generally deemed to constitute a 2 VCs are not the only investors involved in the early stages of financing: business angels and family members constitute the informal VC market. We consider all these forms of financing as VC, but we rely on formal VC statistics for comparisons, as they are the only available data.
channel to facilitate the exit of VCs (Giudici and Roosenboom, 2004) . Conversely, there is sparse evidence of the positive outcome of such markets. As mentioned by Korcsmaros (2002, p.4) , "the jury is still out on the accomplishments attained by stock exchanges dedicated to serving SMEs and the extent to which they have been successful in bringing SMEs to the capital market". While there is support for the notion that, especially for emerging economies, stock exchanges are particularly relevant to helping medium-sized indigenous firms gain access to finance and promoting local market development, there are specific doubts as to the suitability of SMEs for capital markets owing to the asymmetry and agency problems inherent to this category of firms. Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002) provide partial evidence of the success of junior markets in developing new companies.
From 1996 to 2001, 545 companies floated an IPO on one of the new markets in Europe. Ninetyfive of those firms subsequently graduated to a more senior market, and are considered to be "born post new markets" (Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002, p. 35) . These authors (2005) propose the role of markets targeted at entrepreneurial ventures as one of the research themes awaiting further investigation.
In Canada, the use of the public market to finance emerging companies has been severely overstretched. Here, the main market -the TSX -is considered as a junior market, and is fed mainly by a public venture market, the TSXV. This venture market lists companies having no history, no revenues and with minimal assets. Most of the companies entering the TSXV are start-ups, and backdoor listings are nearly as frequent as IPOs, allowing for the listing of companies that do not fulfill the initial listing requirements. 3 When a company graduates to the more senior market, the TSXV considers it a success, and provides extensive help and services to ease this migration; this is not unlike how VCs consider the IPOs of the companies they back as a success. This situation offers a unique opportunity to analyze whether such a public venture market can have a success rate similar to that of a traditional VC market, and if it can develop profitable ventures.
Our general objective is to validate the widely accepted assessment that because VCs have developed specific skills and tools to deal with the asymmetry of information and agency problems specific to new ventures, individual investors cannot compete with them. Accordingly, we analyze the following dimensions: firstly, we measure the global performance of the public venture market and compare this performance with that of the VC market; secondly, we study the efficiency of the venture stock market in feeding the TSX through graduations, and we compare the success rates and times from listing to graduation with the corresponding rates and times observed for VC-backed
IPOs; thirdly, we determine whether these graduations are indeed successes, based on the long-run performance of the population of TSXV firms that graduate to the TSX -this part of the study supplements the scant evidence in place relative to the firms that list on a more senior market;
fourth, we attempt to determine whether the long-run performance can be explained by the characteristics of the graduating companies, and lastly, we examine how the public venture model can be improved. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to provide an extensive analysis of the TSXV.
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The paper is structured as follows. In the first section, we describe the Canadian institutional context. In the second section, we summarize the literature and develop our hypotheses. We present data and stylized facts relative to new listings and graduations in the third section. Section four describes global performance, graduate companies' characteristics, success (graduation) rates and times from listing to graduation. Section five analyzes the average long-run performance of the graduates, and the cross-sectional variation in performance. Section six is devoted to the prediction of graduation and of possible improvements that can be made to the TSXV model, while section seven concludes.
I. INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

A. Global Considerations
According to Schulman (1999) 28 SME exchanges in the world. SME markets state minimal listing rules at low levels, which allow SMEs to float IPOs. However, the rules usually include minimal profitability and size requirements (Schulman, p. 22) . According to Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002) , in the Euro.nm, pre-IPO equity must be higher than Euro1.5 million and IPO proceeds must be over Euro5 million (CAN$8 million). is a substitute for, or a competitor to, the conventional VC market.
B. Canada
There are two main stock exchanges in Canada: the TSX (the main market) and the TSXV. In
December 31, 2007, there were 1,613 issuers listed on the TSX and 2,338 issuers listed on the TSXV (including NEX listings). As Rousseau (2006) asserts, the market capitalization of about half the listings on the AIM ranges between $25 million and $250 million, which places the market in direct competition with the TSX. Heenan Blaikie, one of the leading law firms in the country, considers that the AIM and the TSX offer "a real exit for mature companies not ready for the pros." 7 The main Canadian market is devoted to growing companies. Nicholls (2006, p. 160) notes that all but the largest 245 TSX companies are small-or micro-capitalization companies.
Like its predecessors, 8 the TSXV describes itself as a public venture market with the following distinct features: 1) Provides access to capital for earlier-stage companies or smaller financings;
2) Constitutes a cost-effective stepping stone for international companies looking to list on a quality North American market; 3) Acts as an exchange mandate to mentor the management of newly public companies, and 4) Enables a streamlined graduation to TSX when main market requirements VC is indeed present in Canada, with this country generally credited with having one of the highest levels in the world relative to its population or its economy (Baygan, 2003 Moreover, this market is still too young to lend itself to proper analysis.
The particular strategy followed in Canada can be traced to a set of factors, though no formal causality can be assessed. Firstly, Canada is vibrant in the Mineral and Energy sectors, and has a long tradition of financing activities in the areas, including exploration, through the stock market.
Nearly 50 years ago, Walter and Williamson (1960) 
D. The TSXV and Graduations
To graduate, TSXV listed companies must comply with the TSX minimal listing requirements.
Even though these requirements are higher than those prevailing on the TSXV, they appear to be very low when compared to international standards. In 1998, the TSX introduced the "technology company standards," which required that companies have a minimum of CAN$12 million in cash, adequate funds to cover all planned research and development (R&D) expenditures, general and administrative expenses and capital expenditures for a period of at least two years, and a minimum two-year operating history, including R&D activities. Accordingly, these listing standards allow developing companies to easily access the market while reporting negative earnings, even at a prerevenue stage of their development. 14 For mineral exploration and development-stage companies, the only quantified requirements are working capital of at least CAN$2 million and net tangible assets of CAN$3 million. For industrial companies "forecasting profitability," the TSX requires net tangible assets of CAN$7.5 million and evidence (satisfactory to the TSX) of earnings from ongoing operations for the current or next fiscal year of at least CAN$200,000.
As indicated on its website, the TSXV promotes the migration of growing companies, which it strives to help graduate from the TSXV to the TSX "in a more efficient and economical manner than ever before (…) and promoting the migration of the most successful of these firms to the main market. Rash (1994) considers that such a strategy is one of the main reasons accounting for the failure of the first wave of new markets in Europe.
II. PREVIOUS LITERATURE AND PROPOSITIONS
A. Performance and Success Rates
In the context of the large asymmetry of prevailing information surrounding the financing of new ventures, investors face three forms of risk (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2004) : internal or "agency risk" (Fiet, 1995) , associated with the unobservable actions of managers, and closely related to agency problems; external risk, induced by uncertainty relative to the market and the competition for the product, is referred to as "market risk" by Fiet; lastly, Kaplan and Stromberg define the "execution risk", which is mainly related to the difficulty in making the technology or the strategy work.
Specialized investors, like VCs or business angels, use specific tools and take several actions to limit these various dimensions of risk, both before and after the investment.
VCs and business angels first extract information on the quality of projects (Fiet, 1995; Gompers, 1995) and on the quality of management (Fiet, 1995) . This includes information on the people involved, local conditions, and market studies to evaluate the potential of new products. VCs will often screen thousands of deals a year looking for opportunities, and then finance only the most promising. All the functions advanced in the risk control dimension of the investment require time, competencies and resources that are not available to the individual investors involved in the public market. While some of these investors may have the skills needed to analyze deals, the marginal cost of conducting a due diligence process will be substantially higher than the potential gain the investor can realize, given his partial ownership of the firm. The analysis and screening process the specialized investors engage in suggest that, on average, the firms they select will perform better than those that list directly without being subjected to such a screening process. This effect should be reinforced by the fact that before the financing, venture-backed firms are, on average, more innovative (Engel and Keilbach, 2007) and larger (Puri and Zarutskie, 2007) than non venturebacked firms. Accordingly, our first proposition is:
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Proposition 1: The average return of newly listed firms on the TSXV is low.
On the investment date, VCs use incentive contracts and special financing instruments, such as convertible debt or convertible preferred stock, syndication among VCs or limited investment horizons (Tykvová, 2000) to mitigate the agency risk. Moreover, the contracts generally include the possibility for the outside investor to acquire control of the firm. Theories summarized by Kaplan and Stromberg (2004) indicate that pay-for-performance compensation and VC control will increase with this form of risk. Neither incentive contracts nor convertible stocks can be used to control for the agency risk in the public market.
VC also mitigates agency and external risk after financing by monitoring and advising start-up entrepreneurs (Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 2004) . Cumming et al. (2004) document that VCs have financial, administrative, marketing or strategic/management value-added activities. Finally, VCs contribute to reducing the costs of informational asymmetries (Amit et al., 1998) , and can ease subsequent financing rounds. According to Bottazzi et al. (2008) , VC investor activism is positively related to the success of portfolio companies. In our context, the monitoring and advising activities of VCs induce a double disadvantage for the firm being developed through the public market, where such activities are unlikely to be systematic. 18 Firstly, publicly listed firms cannot benefit from the value-added activities, even while they are at a stage of their development when such activities can be crucial, and secondly, the management is not given the opportunity to improve its skills. 17 The lack of detailed data on VC performance in Canada impedes any detailed comparison between the public and the conventional venture capital markets. The only available figure provided by the industry is a mean rate of return for the 1995-2005 period. 18 Indeed, one or several public investors could be actively involved in monitoring or guiding firms listed on the TSXV, but such involvement is not the rule on a public market. In Canada, most private placements, and even most seasoned equity offerings, are launched by non-profitable public companies. 
B. Performance of Graduates
Three stakeholders are involved in the graduation process: exchanges, managers and shareholders.
We analyze the motivations of each one to formulate our forecasts relative to the pre-and postgraduation stock price performance.
Exchanges: Traditionally, an exchange listing can be considered a double signal that a firm fulfills existing listing requirements, and will eventually meet ongoing requirements. According to Harris were high. Harris (2006) argues that the stock exchanges currently have strong incentives to act against the public interest in easing the entry of new companies, mainly during hot issues markets.
The incentive of early disposition of successful companies does not exist for VC investors. Rather, they can choose the optimal time, methods and tools to exit (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003) . VCs incur direct costs if they exit too early from a promising investment. The same situation exists for non-VC-backed IPOs. Aside from the urgent need for liquidity, a company has no incentive to enter the market too early. Listing on the main market is thus likely to be more premature among graduating firms than among conventional new listings. If companies graduate before reaching profitability, and without a strong management team, their probability of suffering a liquidity crash will be high (Mudambi and Treichel, 2005) .
Management:
Two dimensions are relevant here, the first being the reason for, and timing of, the listing change, and the second, the lack of involvement of knowledgeable investors, in the case of graduations.
Managers may decide to exit the venture market and list on the regular exchange for several reasons. The first is growth: managers identify several investment opportunities, and expect to finance these projects at a lower cost of capital on a more liquid market. However, graduates are generally small firms with median shareholders' equity in the vicinity of CAN$10 million, while several firms on the venture exchange have capitalizations higher than CAN$100 million.
Accordingly, we consider this motivation to be more applicable to the larger graduates than for the smaller ones, which can easily finance their projects from the TSXV. Secondly, managers will contemplate a listing change if they deem that investors prefer high levels of regulation, and will probably value their stocks higher in the more strictly regulated main market. Such a hypothesis is analyzed by Jenkinson and Ramadorai (2007) , based on listing changes between the LSE and the AIM. They observe that the initial effects of listing changes on prices are reversed over several months following the change, and suggest that particular investor clienteles exist for the two regulatory standards. The differences in regulatory requirements between the TSX and the TSXV are smaller than those prevailing between the LSE (rules-based regulation) and the AIM (principlesbased regulation). Based on the analysis by Jenkinson and Ramadorai, we cannot anticipate significant effects of the listing changes on prices. Lastly, managers may time their listing decisions to take advantage of a temporary good stock valuation. Dharan and Ikenberry (1995) find that after firms move trading in their stocks to the AMEX or NYSE, stock returns are generally poor, probably because managers time their applications for listing -managers of smaller firms, for which initial listing requirements may be more demanding, tend to apply for listings before a decline in performance. Poor post-listing performance is not observed in larger firms. Cheng (2005) finds that the "post-listing drift" is confined to the small set of firms moving from NASDAQ to AMEX during [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] , with small sizes and low book-to-market ratios. He explains that firms are more likely to move their trading locations when the stock prices are higher, but we cannot definitely determine the reasons for listing changes. However, none of the motivations proposed in the literature allow for the anticipation of a strong listing performance, except for larger firms, which graduate in order to finance large investment projects.
The main difference between graduations and IPOs lie in the fact that, for growing companies in the U.S., VCs are often involved in the financing prior to the listing. Compared to IPOs backed by VCs, firms that graduate from the public venture market will suffer a significant disadvantage. As summarized by Chemmanur and Loutskina (2006) , several arguments can account for VC-backed IPOs generally performing better (Doukas and Gonenc, 2005) and exhibiting a higher survival rate than conventional IPOs (Jain and Kini, 2000) . Firstly, VCs fund only a small minority of firms, and these firms are of better quality than non-VC backed firms; this is the "screening" effect. Secondly, VCs devote a considerable amount of time to monitoring firm management in the pre-IPO stage (Gompers, 1995) . The combined effect of screening and monitoring suggests that "the quality of firms brought public with VC backing is likely to be higher than that of non-VC backed firms" (Chemmanur and Loutskina, 2006) . A third argument relates to the involvement of the VC in the newly listed firm, after the IPO. As underlined by Lerner (1995) and by Barry et al. (1990) , in a significant number of instances, VCs retain a seat on the board of the newly listed firm even after cashing out. As VCs are specialized providers of oversight, Lerner proposes that it might be expected that these firms will be less prone to agency problems. VCs have strong incentives to ensure that optimal governance systems are in place at the time their portfolio firm goes public, as their returns depend on the share price at the time lockup rules allow them to sell their stakes; this is the "oversight effect". Empirically, Chou et al. (2006) evidence that expert market intermediaries may help start-ups in their portfolio acquire resources for successful development, which in turn enhances the aftermarket survivorship of IPO-issuing firms. Lastly, Chemmanur and Loutskina evidence a "market power effect". VCs develop long-term relationships with various participants in the IPO market (underwriters, institutional investors, and analysts), and these relationships enable them to attract greater participation by these market players in the IPOs they backed. In turn, the VCs can obtain a higher price for the equity of these firms, as greater support from analysts and institutional investors is generally associated with better performance. To summarize, a firm that lists on the main market after graduating from the public (as opposed to the conventional venture capital) market is likely to suffer from lower quality (screening effect), less skilled management and weaker governance (monitoring effect), less support after the listing (oversight effect) and a lower interest among market participants (market power effect). Ivanov et al. (2008) demonstrate that the reputation of VCs has a strongly positive association with their post-IPO long-run performance.
While it provides none of the classical functions usually associated with reputable VCs, the public venture market can be assimilated into low-reputation VCs.
Investors: While investors have no decision making power in the graduation process, they can however, both induce and be influenced by the graduation. If managers time the graduation to coincide with a period when stock prices are abnormally high, then graduations 1) will occur after strong rallies, and 2) are likely to be followed by poor returns. Such a pattern is likely if we note that both the exchanges and the managers have advantages, but face no significant costs in promoting the graduation. That said, it should be pointed out that valuation errors are more likely in some categories of stocks. Stronger underperformance is likely among firms whose value rests primarily on future opportunities, because valuation errors are more likely to be associated with expansion projects than with the refinancing of current activities. Accordingly, graduate firms with no revenues or earnings, as well as those with highly intangible assets, are likely to exhibit a strong pattern of abnormal positive returns before graduation and negative returns on the main market.
This discussion and previous results lead to the following three propositions:
Proposition 3: Graduations from the TSXV to the main exchanges generally follow a significant rally in stock prices. and searches in the Exchange reviews and SEDAR to determine whether the new issues were CPCs.
A total of 1,311 CPCs were created during the period, but 1,050 successfully completed the QT required to list a new company. QTs were identified for each CPC using the TSXV website, along with SEDAR, the Survey of Predecessor and Defunct Companies published by the Financial Post (Survey), Lexis-Nexis and Internet browsers. Often, companies use backdoor listing methods to access the market without issuing equity, or they delay the offering for several weeks or months.
We analyzed each transaction to determine the amounts collected around the time of listing. We consider that financing is associated with a backdoor listing if it occurs during the 12 months following the listing. We got the gross proceeds by searching in SEDAR and the FPinfomart.ca new issue database.
The TSXV provided us with a list of companies that graduated from January 1, 1995 to April 30,
2007
. We supplement these data for the period going from January 1, 1989 to December 31, 1994, using the monthly new listings of the TSX Review. We carefully scanned these lists to collect the new listings originating from migrations from the TSXV (or its predecessors), and obtained an initial sample of 830 graduations. We noted the following situations that did not fit exactly into the mould: Eight graduations occurred simultaneously on the TSX and on a foreign market (NASDAQ). In these cases, we retained the graduation date and any relevant observations. In 16 cases, the TSXV reported a graduation to the TSX, but the company had already listed abroad (NASDAQ, AIM, Frankfurt or AMEX) a few weeks or months prior to being listed on the TSX. We considered such cases as graduations, but the event dates were changed to the date of the first listing on a more senior exchange. Thirdly, four companies had been listed on the OTC in the U.S. before graduating to the TSX. We retained these cases because we found that none of them was an SEC (Baygan, 2003) . We estimate the median post-money shareholders' equity at around CAN$1 million. In terms of size, gross proceeds and stages of development, these new listings have very little in common with the new listings reported in the U.S. penny stock market by Bradley et al. (2006) , in the AIM by Derrien and Kecskes (2007) or in the New Markets in Europe (Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002 (Ritter, 2006) .
IV. PERFORMANCE AND GRADUATIONS FROM THE TSXV
A Global Performance conventional VC market return. We also report the equally-weighted index, but this index is largely influenced by the huge returns of several very small stocks, jumping from 1 to 10 cents.
Accordingly, we discuss the value-weighted returns. We set the maximum monthly return to 1000%
(approximately 0.03% of the distribution), in order to limit the influence of outliers.
Overall, the TSXV outperforms the main market, with the newly listed firm index posting an average rate of return of 15.69% versus 10.70% for the main market. However, the standard deviation is 35.40% for the former market versus 14.34% for the latter. Similar results appear when the official indexes are used. However, this market is highly volatile, illiquid, and dominated by small and growth stocks: it probably does not compensate adequately for the various forms of risk 22 The current S&P/TSXV index was created in 2002. Previously, a CDNX index was available, back in 1999. During the previous years, the venture market was composed of several entities, each with its own index. Accordingly, the official indexes cannot be used for a long-term analysis. 23 To be included in the official S&P/TSXV index, a firm must represent more than 0 This is an unexpected result, and our first proposition is not verified. Furthermore, the result is hard to reconcile with the numerous studies that give the private VC a strong advantage in dealing with new ventures. A first explanation is that the reported VC return is abnormally low, because it includes the very poor return of Labor-Sponsored VC Funds (LSVCC), which benefit from large tax advantages but suffer from poor governance (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2006) , and whose invested firms perform badly (Brander et al., 2008) . A second explanation could be that the TSXV is largely exposed to the natural resources sector, while the VC is not. To assess the validity of this explanation, we re-estimate the new listings index, excluding the firms belonging to the Mineral and Energy subsectors. Results are reported in Table 2 . Excluding the natural resources firms decreases the return of the index, but it still remains significantly higher than the VC return, and the difference between the public and the private market returns is over 1000 basis points annually. A third explanation for the observed difference could be a competition effect. With quicker and lighter procedures (mainly in the case of RTOs), the TSXV may have captured a significant market share of promising companies usually oriented toward the traditional VC. 
***Insert
B. Success Rates
The annual number of graduations is shown in the leftmost column of previous studies linking VC involvement to a larger probability of success. Overall, the success (graduation) rate of the TSXV is 7.67%. Table 3 about here***
***Insert
C. Test of Propositions 2a and 2b
To validate proposition 2a, we need comparable data related to the success rate of VCs. Brander et al. (2008) provide an extensive study of the exit rates, for the whole population of 3,720 Canadian VC-backed firms from 1996 through 2004. 25 They report a meager exit rate by IPOs of 3.1% for the population. Moreover, most of the VC-backed IPOs take place on the TSXV, and Brander et al.
estimate the rate of IPOs on the main exchange to be 1.8%. This number can be compared to the 25 Amit et al. (1998) , for the period going from 1991 to 1996, report that 16% of firms in which VCs invest exit by IPOs. Cumming and McIntosh (2003) measure very similar proportions of exits by IPOs in the U.S. and in Canada (26.8% and 26.9%, respectively). However, these papers report the proportions of exit by IPOs relative to all the VC exits, but they do not report the number of IPOs to the population of firms in which the VCs invest. The large difference between these estimations and the proportion reported by Brandel et al. (2008) can probably be traced to the data collection process they implement. They capture 3,720 venture-backed firms whereas the Thomson Financial (Thomson MacDonald) database, which is generally used for VC studies in Canada, identifies only 1,763 invested companies during the same period.
7.67% rate which we estimate for the public market. Although the significance of this difference is beyond the testing ability of our data, the public venture market in Canada appears to provide a graduation rate for TSXV listed companies that is approximately four times the exit rate by IPOs on the main market estimated for VCs. While this unexpected result is in line with our first observation of a superior return on the public versus the private VC market, it does not however confirm our proposition 2a. The average time before IPO exits (success) for VCs is estimated at about 3 years in the U.S. (Cumming and Johan, 2007; Giot and Schwienbacher, 2007) , and at about 2.45 years in Canada (Cumming and Johan, 2007) . We estimate a mean time to graduation of 5.02 years (standard deviation of 4.29 years), while the median is 3.45 years. The time to graduation is twice as long for TSXV successes as for VC exits by IPO, which is consistent with our proposition 2b.
In Canada, developing companies through a public venture market takes more time but produces a larger rate of success than does the private VC market. The VCs finance more firms than the public market (3,720 vs. 1,647 from 1996 to 2004). However, the TSXV feeds the main market more intensively than does the VC market, at a proportion of seven to one for the whole period we 
D. Graduation Characteristics
To be able to study the three-year performance of graduates, we limit the analysis to the 671 cases observed before December 2004, and restrict the sample to the 647 graduations for which accounting data is available. 26 Other companies, with the former companies generally having lower total assets, and posting negative earnings in a majority of cases (57.14%). Among Other companies, 27.46% report losses.
Depending on the sector of activity, the companies thus graduate under very different conditions. ***Insert Table 4 about here***
V. PERFORMANCES OF GRADUATES
This section presents an analysis of the performance of the population of graduations. These companies migrate from the TSXV to the TSX without being backed by specialized investors, generally credited for favoring good post-listing performance. We examine the three-year pregraduation and three-year post-graduation performance (propositions 3 and 4), using different metrics for estimating abnormal (or excess) long-run returns. We then attempt to explain the crosssectional differences in performance that exist following graduation (proposition 5).
Estimating long-run performance is a challenging task, for which several methods have been proposed. The complexity originates from the characteristics of the studied population: like initial issuers, graduate firms generally exhibit lower size and higher growth expectations than the market as a whole, and their performance cannot be compared with that of a conventional index. We constructed and used a benchmark comprised of firms with similar characteristics. Most of the previous empirical works related to new listings, private placements and VC-backed IPOs (Brau et al., 2004) use either one of the event-time approaches, namely, cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs). 27 However, these methods suffer from various problems 28 , particularly in the context of our analysis. 29 Accordingly, we report event-time results only to allow comparisons with previous research findings, and center our analysis on calendar-time methods. As the focus of the paper is not on methodological intricacy, we report some of the details in Appendix 1.
A. Event-Time Abnormal Returns
Given the particular characteristics of the companies studied, we use size and book-to-market control portfolios as benchmarks for computing abnormal returns. 30 We report two sets of results, depending on the weighting scheme employed. The equally-weighted (EW) method gives an equal weight to each observation, and the results largely reflect the performance of small capitalized firms, while the value-weighted (VW) scheme for its part lends greater weight to larger firms.
Reporting both results allows us to determine whether or not the estimated performance is driven by 27 The biggest advantage of the BHAR estimator is that it precisely measures investor experience. 28 Event-time approaches indeed suffer from various problems associated with both the measurement of abnormal returns and the specification of tests for non-zero abnormal returns induced by cross-sectional dependence among sample firms (Kothari and Warner, 2007) . 29 Brav and Gompers (1997) analyze these problems in the particular case of VC-backed IPOs. Cheng (2005) provides an in-depth discussion of the weaknesses of event-time methods in the case of listing changes. 30 To construct these reference portfolios, we extract Canadian firms' book-equity from the Thomson's CanCorp Financials database, and the market equity and monthly stock returns from DataStream. We rank all Canadian stocks each month according to their market capitalizations, and form three tercile portfolios. Independently, all Canadian stocks are also ranked according to their book-to-market ratios, and three portfolios are formed. The returns of the nine monthly rebalanced portfolios are calculated as the valueweighted average of the individual-firm monthly returns in each of the size/book-to-market intersections. Each graduate firm is then assigned a control portfolio based on its market capitalization and book-to-market ratio over the performance test period examined.
just a subgroup of issuers. Table 5 summarizes CARs obtained on the pre-and post-graduation periods with the reference portfolios and with both weighted schemes, and similar results using BHARs.
The CARs over the three-year pre-graduation period are highly significant: 167.53% (EW) and 75.56% (VW). This rally is consistent with the hypothesis that graduates are, on average, good performers that post high growth. This observation is also consistent with investors' positive perception of potential graduation. The difference between VW and EW results indicates that small firms rally even more than larger ones. Over the three-year post-graduation period, Canadian graduate firms on average do not post significant underperformance when an EW scheme is used. A significant post-graduation drift of -14.66% however appears when a value-weighted scheme is applied. The use of the BHAR method confirms our previous findings of a rally before graduation.
The post-graduation performance becomes non-significant, regardless of the weighting scheme used. We confirm the third proposition of a significant rally before graduation, but reject the fourth proposition, which projects significant underperformance following graduation, except for one test (CAR VW). Table 5 about here***
***Insert
B. Calendar-Time Abnormal Returns
We estimate abnormal returns through the alphas obtained from the Fama and French (1993) threefactor pricing model (TFPM). In this approach, the intercept (α in equation 1) from time series regressions is an indicator of the risk-adjusted performance. This parameter has an interpretation analogous to Jensen's alpha in the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). For example, for the postgraduation 36-month period, we construct our calendar-time portfolio as follows: a graduate company enters our calendar-time portfolio at the graduation date, and is removed 36 months later.
We proceed in like manner for the 36-month pre-graduation period. We then calculate the valueweighted return of our graduate firm portfolio, and estimate the following regression:
The dependent variable of the regression is the monthly excess return of the portfolio (R p,t -R f,t ), which corresponds for a given month, t, to the returns of the portfolio of graduate companies (R p,t ) minus the risk-free rate (the monthly rate of 91-day Canadian Government Treasury bills, R f,t ). The independent variables are the excess market return and two zero-investment portfolios, which we construct to mimic the risk factors common to all securities. β p , s p , h p stand for the loadings of the portfolio on each risk factor: the market, SMB (size) and HML (book-to-market ratio).
Panel A of Table 6 summarizes the pre-and post-graduation performance, using the Fama and French risk factor approach. 31 The three-year average abnormal performance before graduation is positive and highly significant: +102.7%. This run-up is in line with the results of previous studies, and with the results obtained via event-time methods. It is also consistent with proposition 3.
Panel B of Table 6 shows that the magnitude of the run-up differs considerably, depending on the In contrast, the long-run performance following graduation is negative, but not significantly different from zero (at the conventional threshold of 5%) for the whole period examined (-16.6%), as well as for two of the three graduation periods examined. The abnormal return is significant at the 10% level during the second period, a result probably attributable to the large number of graduates originating from the technology sector during this period. Using calendar-time portfolios with the Fama and French risk factors, we reject proposition 4: the aftermarket performance of graduate companies is not significantly different from zero.
Loadings reported in Table 6 are important because they allow the characterization of the graduate sample relative to the market. Betas of graduate firms are significantly higher than 1 before and after graduation: graduate companies tend to have less market risk after graduation. SMB loadings are highly significant before and after graduation: graduate companies are still much smaller than their counterparts listed on the TSX. Finally, HML loadings are negative both before and after graduation: graduate firms tend to be more growth-oriented. Table 6 about here***
***Insert
The implications of these results are as follows. Firstly, graduate companies perform well before their migration, and provide steady returns to investors. Secondly, their returns following graduation are normal, according to standard statistical tests. Economically, the post-graduation return during the 1995-2000 period is highly negative (-32.5%), but not significant at the 5% level.
This can be traced to the irrationality of pricing that reigned in several sectors during the bubble.
Even if they grow without the support of knowledgeable investors, several graduate companies are able to provide reasonable rates of return. We now turn to the explanation of the differences that exist between these performances.
C. Cross-sectional Variation in Performance
In Table 7 , we report the abnormal returns of graduations by sector. The price run-up of Minerals and Energy firms is similar to that observed for the whole sample: 99.5% and 100.2%, respectively.
It is much greater for technology firms (175.1%), and much less for the Other sector (60.8%). This result can be partially explained by the concentration of graduations in the technology sector during the bubble. There are even more significant cross-sectional variations in post-graduation results.
Minerals firms posted a significant underperformance during the three-year period following the graduation: -74.3%. Technology firms followed the same pattern, posting a negative performance of -53.3%. In contrast, the Energy graduate firms posted a positive but non-significant aftermarket performance (16.6%), while Other sector firms posted an almost null abnormal performance. The pre-and post-graduation stock price pattern of firms in the High-Tech and Minerals sectors is consistent with the irrational behavior of investors that overreact in anticipation of the graduation.
These differences in results can be traced to the differences in the characteristics of the graduates among the sectors. High-Tech and Minerals firms generally graduate without earnings, even before reaching the revenues stage.
Panels B and C of Table 7 differentiate results by pre-graduation operating performance. We distinguish companies with revenues from firms with no revenues, and companies with positive earnings from companies with negative earnings. During the three-year pre-graduation period, firms recording revenues realized a significant 134.0% return, while firms with no revenues generated a non-significant 56.0% return. During the three-year post-graduation period examined, firms recording revenues posted a non-significant -10.8% return, while firms with no revenues exhibited a significant underperformance of -38.7%. Unexpectedly, firms recording positive and negative earnings achieved similar returns during the pre-graduation period: 89.8% and 112.6%. However, during the post-graduation period, the former had a positive but non-significant abnormal return (12.0%), while the latter had a significant underperformance of -53.4%.
These results corroborate the fact that the market in general tends to overreact to the assumed graduation. However, post-graduation underperformance is concentrated in two sectors: High-Tech and Minerals, where this underperformance is driven mainly by firms with poor operating performance before graduation. Our results are consistent with proposition 5, which stipulates that long-run performance following graduation should be particularly low if the real value of the graduate is difficult to assess. Table 7 about here***
***Insert
VI. Can the TSXV Model be Improved?
The public venture capital model used in Canada imposes very limited requirements to new listings.
New listings seem to provide investors with a rate of return which is commensurate with that of the main market, and which overrides the rate of return of the conventional VC industry. However, the observed margin between the returns on the main market and on the TSXV portfolio of newly listed firms can hardly compensate investors for the high volatility, the lack of liquidity and the small size of the latter. In this section, we examine the extent to which the graduation, and the period leading up to the event, can be partially predicted by the main characteristics of the issuers at the listing time. We then analyze the potential effect of the application of a simple screening model on the rate of return for investors. The model needs to be simple, because the number of usable variables at the listing date is limited by the nature of the issuers: a sizable proportion of them report no revenues, and all accounting data generally used to forecast failure or success cannot be exploited. Moreover, the length of the period analyzed and the size of the whole sample, composed of 2,472 firms, make it impossible to obtain the data related to ownership and board composition used by Jain et al. (2007) in a similar context.
We consider that the probability to graduate is positively related to the size of the firm at the IPO, and we estimate it using the natural logarithm of the post-listing assets (LOGASSETS). We also argue that a firm reporting earnings before listing should have a better chance to graduate. We introduce a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer has negative earnings per share (DNE), and consider that firms with more growth opportunities are more likely to graduate. We use the classical measure for the relative weight of growth opportunities, the book-to-market (BTM) ratio. We estimate this ratio before the listing, in order to avoid capturing a post-listing valuation effect. It is estimated by dividing the shareholders' equity at the end of the previous fiscal year by the simultaneous market value. We introduce dummy variables to consider the effects of the main sectors. We indicate these sectors through the dichotomous variables DMINERAL, DENERGY and DHT, respectively. The operating quality of companies going public in hot markets is assumed to be low (Coakley et al., 2007) . We control for this factor by using the geometric return for the 12 months preceding the listing date (RM12M1).
We use Probit models to analyze the probability to graduate and the semi-parametric Cox
Proportional Hazards model to identify variables that significantly influence the time to graduation.
The models have already been carefully described, in a similar context, by Demers and Joos (2007) and by Jain et al. (2007) , and we do not present them in detail in this paper. Table 8 presents the results of the Probit model. The model is globally significant, meaning that the probability to graduate depends partially on variables observable at the listing time. Only the BTM does not play a significant role, as a result of the difficulty in estimating the book value for growing firms without revenues or tangible assets. Mainly, size is positively related to the probability of a graduation, while the lack of positive earnings and the hot issue period have a negative influence on the probability of success. We report the marginal effects which indicate economic significance.
The sector appears to have a stronger impact on the probability to graduate; for example, the inclusion of a newly listed firm in the High-Tech (Mineral) sector increases the probability of graduation by 5.6% (4.9%). Though statistically significant, the impact of reporting earnings on the probability to graduate is surprisingly low -reporting negative earnings decreases the probability of graduation by 2.4%. In Table 8 , we also report the results of the Cox model that explain the time to graduation, using the same set of variables as in the Probit model. All variables appear to be significant, except the book-to-market and the dummy variable associated with negative earnings.
We report the risk (hazard) ratios to assess the economic significance of our results. For a unit change in the predictor variable, the relative risk ratio of outcome m relative to the referent group is expected to change by this ratio, assuming that the variables in the model are held constant. A 2.302 risk ratio (for variable DHT), for example, indicates that the chance of graduation of an issuer in the High-Tech sector is 2.3 times that of a firm that does not belong to this sector, after controlling for other covariates. These ratios confirm that the differences in the occurrence of graduation are largely associated with the activities of the listed firms. Moreover, the pre-listing market return has a negative influence on the time to graduation, while the book-to-market is positively associated.
Overall, the model is highly significant. Table 8 about here*** To assess whether it is possible to use such a model to invest in more promising firms, we use an out-of-sample forecasting model. We split the whole sample of 2,472 firms entering the TSXV from January 1986 through December 2004 into two subsamples composed randomly, except that we keep the same median size and the same industrial representation in each group. We use the first subsample to estimate the parameters of the Probit model which account for the probability of graduation, as presented in Table 8 . We then use the parameter estimates of this model to calculate each firm's probability of graduation in the second subsample. We rank the probabilities obtained and split the second subsample into two groups. For the high-and low-probability of graduation groups respectively, we estimate the monthly average returns, on a value-weighted basis, for the whole period. Accordingly, a stock is included in the portfolio from its inception in the market up to the time of the following event: graduation, delisting or acquisition (when the returns' series ends)
***Insert
or the end of our period of analysis. This strategy mimics that of the conventional evergreen VC. In Table 9 , we report the value-weighted portfolio returns.
Using a simple screening model applied to the new listings on the TSXV, we can split the sample into two very different groups. The high probability of graduation group shows an annualized return of 24.45%, versus 6.62% for the low probability group. Corresponding values for the standard deviation are 78.74% and 36.27%, respectively. The difference between the average returns in the two groups is not statistically significant, as a result of the high dispersion present. However, the results of this exercise underline two important points. Firstly, using such a rule to screen new listings would allow an investor to largely outperform the (negative) return of the VC industry.
Secondly, the stock exchange could probably improve its performance by refining its requirements.
The in-depth analysis of the determinants of graduation, success and failure of firms listed on the TSXV is a promising path for future research. ***Insert Table 9 about here***
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper uses the particular setting that prevails in Canada to analyze how a stock exchange can be used to finance emerging companies and to fulfill the role usually played by formal and informal VC. Several theoretical arguments suggest that such an experience would fail. Emerging businesses present a high level of information asymmetry, and generate agency problems that specialized investors are used to dealing with. They have developed specific tools and the ability to screen the projects (Fiet, 1995) , design securities, monitor and counsel management (Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 2004) . These actions and skills allow them to control various forms of risk (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2001) , allowing the firms to exit under the best possible conditions, and their market power benefits the firms they list (Chemmanur and Loutskina, 2006) . These tools and skills
give the VC a comparative advantage over other investors (Gompers, 1995; Amit et al., 1998) . The individual investors on the public market own none of these tools, which are considered essential, but they face the same level of risk and asymmetry as VCs. To summarize, the classical wisdom is that VCs have the essential skills, tools and role in screening, monitoring, overseeing and backing new ventures. Without the help of such specialized investors, the growth of new ventures and their success rates are assumed to be low, and a public venture capital market would likely not survive.
The Canadian public venture market is wide open to early stage companies, whose size and gross proceeds are generally lower than those reported for VC investments, and far less than those mentioned in the junior markets in Europe. Canada has developed a specific path used to finance emerging firms, which is different from the classical VC scheme used to provide equity to businesses at the pre-profitability stage. A first and unexpected result is that, on average, the rate of return of this market, estimated using all new listings occurring during the 20 years under analysis, is higher than the rate of return of the main market, and largely higher than the return reported by the VC industry in Canada. An investor seeking exposure to the VC would have made a better choice investing in the public rather than in the conventional market.
According to the definition of the venture exchange itself, successes are defined as graduations of TSXV companies to a more senior market. We measured the success rate of new entrants, and estimated the time to success, from the listing to the graduation date. We then compared these data with data reported for traditional VCs, which usually consider an IPO to be a success. We find that the success rate of the public venture market is approximately four times the corresponding rate for traditional VCs. During the period under analysis, the ratio of graduations to VC-backed IPOs was approximately seven to one. The time to success is longer for the public venture market than for the conventional private VC market.
Several arguments indicate that graduation from the TSXV to the TSX could be construed as a "false" success. Notably, both exchanges benefit from promoting early graduation, but investors might be fooled by the prospect of such a promotion, and the positive role assumed to be played by VCs after the listing cannot exist under existing graduation situations. We analyze the long-run performance of the population of newly listed firms that graduate to a more senior market, using concurrent and sophisticated methods, in order to overcome the methodological problems inherent in long-run performance analysis. Graduate firms are still micro caps, by North American standards.
Half of these firms graduate before achieving profitability, and almost a quarter of them exhibit no revenues. The graduations generally follow a significant rally in stock prices. The three-year average abnormal performance before graduation is positive and significant. Moreover, the graduations are generally followed by a negative but non-significant underperformance, in contrast with the classical observation of a long-run underperformance following IPOs (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001 ). Our observations are not consistent with the proposition that graduations are timed by managers, or are promoted too early by exchanges. Graduate firms provide a strong return before graduation and a fair return thereafter. They can be considered real successes, even though several of them exhibit poor returns after graduation. Arguably, the average post-graduation performance conceals a very large cross-sectional variation in performance. This underperformance is concentrated mainly in the High-Tech and Minerals sectors, and is largely driven by firms that do not report sales before graduation, and whose value lies predominantly in growth opportunities.
The public venture market imposes very minimal restrictions for listing. We attempt to analyze whether simple screening rules, similar to the classical minimal requirements for exchanges, could improve the model. We model the extent to which the graduation and the time to graduation can be explained by the characteristics of firms seeking to be listed. The models are significant, and the out-of-sample test indicates that the application of simple rules strongly influences the rate of return for investors involved in this market. This opens the door to refining the listing criteria in order to improve the performance of this market and the probability of success, which, as underscored by Bottazzi and Da Rin (2005) , is extremely crucial. 
corresponds for a given month t. to the returns of the portfolios of private and public equity issues (R p.t ) less the risk-free rate (the monthly rate of 91-day Canadian Government Treasury bills. R f.t ). β p . s p . h p are the loadings of the portfolios on each risk factor: the market (10% capped index, TSXC), SMB (size) and HML (book-to-market ratio). Alpha indicates the monthly average abnormal return of our graduate firm sample. Arith stands for the arithmetic abnormal return over the period considered. We estimate the weighted least squares (WLS) time series regression in which the weights are proportional to the square root of the number of firms present in each month t. The t-statistics for each parameter are shown in parentheses. H 0 for the β coefficient is β equals to one. We estimate abnormal returns for the three-year horizon preceding the graduation (-36; -1), and the three-year horizon following it (+1; +36). The whole sample comprises 336 graduations that occurred from January 1989 through December 2004. We examine value-weighted (monthly-rebalanced) calendar-time portfolio returns. We regress the monthly excess returns to the calendar-time portfolios, p,t (10% capped index) , SMB (size) and HML (book-to-market ratio). Alpha indicates the monthly average abnormal return of our graduate firm sample. Arith stands for the arithmetic abnormal return over the period considered. We estimate the weighted least squares (WLS) time series regression in which the weights are proportional to the square root of the number of firms present in each month t. The t-statistics for each parameter are shown in parentheses. The models are estimated using a sample of 2,472 TSXV newly listed firms over the 1986-2004 period. The probit procedure (Model 1) models the probabilities of having DGRADi = 1, with DGRAD being a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm graduates and 0 otherwise. The marginal effects appear between brackets and indicate the economic significance. The Cox Proportional Hazard procedure (Model 2) models the time to graduation that is measured as the number of months elapsed between the listing month and the month in which the firm graduates. Hazard (risk) ratios appear between brackets (Model 2). DNE is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer has negative earnings per share (EPS). LOGASSETS is defined by the natural logarithm of the post-listing assets. DHT is a dummy variable set to 1 if the firms produces high-tech products based on the SIC identification and 0 otherwise. DMINERAL is 1 if the industry of the firm is Natural resources and 0 otherwise, and DENERGY is a dummy variable set to 1 if the industry of the firm is Oil and Gas and 0 otherwise. RM12M1 is the geometric return for the 12 months preceding the listing date. BTM is the book-to-market ratio on the listing date. We split the whole sample of 2,472 firms entering the TSXV from January 1986 through December 2004 into two subsamples. We use the first subsample to run the probit model which explains the probability of graduation, presented in Table 8 . We then use the parameter estimates of this model to calculate the probability of graduation of each firm in the second subsample. We rank the probabilities obtained and split the second subsample into two groups. For the groups of high and low probability of graduation respectively, we estimate average monthly value-weighted raw returns, including each firm up to the time it delists, graduates, or merges or up to the end of the study period. 
Since the OLS procedure has a weak ability to detect abnormal performance because it averages over months of low and heavy event activity, we use a WLS procedure instead. The weights are proportional to the square root of the number of firms present on each calendar month. Market and all risk factors and portfolio returns are value-weighted and capped. 
